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Three aspects of property rights theory are particularly relevant to the con-
version of the walnut-marketing cooperative, Diamond Walnut Growers (DWG),
into a publicly traded stockholder-owned corporation. The horizon problem be-
came apparent when DWG began investing heavily in branded, value-added prod-
ucts. The resulting need for additional member capital raised the free rider problem.
The principal-agent problem was also relevant, given the increasing complexity of
DWG’s ﬁnancing and marketing activities. An additional economic issue surround-
ing the conversion was the monopsonistic situation created when members signed
long-term marketing agreements with the new ﬁrm that was maximizing share-




tion. The cooperative’s history can be traced back to 1912, when chaotic marketing
conditions led to the formation of the California Walnut Marketing Association. Its
structure, however, changed substantially over its lifetime. As a federation of lo-
cal walnut packing cooperatives, the California Walnut Marketing Association pro-
vided economic stability, but, in response to changing market conditions, in 1956 it
became a centralized cooperative, changed its name to Diamond Walnut Growers,
and built processing facilities in Stockton, CA to expand its production of shelled
walnuts.
In the late 1990s, DWG became a more competitive supplier to American gro-
cery chains by broadening its product line of culinary and in-shell nuts. Headquar-
tered in Stockton, its 550,000 square foot processing facility was described at the
time as the largest and most modern walnut processing facility in the world (Dia-
mond Walnut Growers 2002). It also operated three smaller shelling plants in the
San Joaquin Valley. At the time of its conversion to a publicly traded corporation,
DWG was the leading marketer of culinary and in-shell nuts, with a 38.5 percent
dollar-volume market share (Diamond Foods 2005a).
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DWG’s Member Services department included a vice president and six re-
gional ﬁeld representatives. The cooperative utilized extensive quality control mea-
sures, paying shelling bonuses for deliveries with low levels of insect damage and
off-grade nuts. Members were paid premiums for early deliveries of qualiﬁed in-
shell varieties. The membership agreement included an exclusive marketing clause,
whereby all walnuts produced by a DWG member had to be delivered to the coop-
erative. The cooperative maintained a strong government relations program, both at
state and federal levels.
Description of the Industry
English walnuts are the major commercial type of walnuts grown in the United
States, and California accounts for over 99 percent of the nation’s commercial pro-
duction. Between 1982 and 2007, walnut acreage in California increased 23 percent
and production rose 39 percent (Pollack & Perez 2008). In 2006, over 4,000 walnut
growers in ﬁve counties in the San Joaquin and Sacramento Valleys accounted for
63 percent of the state’s total production (California Walnut Board 2007).
DWG’s share of the state’s walnut crop peaked at 58 percent in 1983, but then
dropped sharply into the mid-40 percent range due to poor returns. When the con-
version occurred, DWG’s deliveries represented 46 percent of the state’s walnut
crop (Diamond Foods 2005a). Currently, there are 59 walnut handlers in Califor-
nia. Half of them provide only basic services, marketing only in-shell and shelled
walnuts (California Walnut Board 2008a). Twenty-four have value-added products,
such as vacuum packing, walnuts in consumer-friendly canisters, and walnut oil.
Diamond Foods is the only handler that offers all these products. Only three other
handlers have the canister packing capacity.
Between 2003 and 2007, walnut crop prices doubled, from US$1,160 per ton to
US$2,320 (United States Department of Agriculture-National Agricultural Statis-
tics Service 2008). Between 1997/98 and 2006/07, per capita consumption of wal-
nuts in the U.S. rose from 0.36 pounds to 0.53 pounds (Pollack & Perez 2008). One
of the major factors contributing to the strong demand is recent ﬁndings regarding
the health beneﬁts of walnuts. They are one of the most nutrient-dense whole food
sources of alpha-linolenic acid (ALA), an essential omega-3 fatty acid that may
help reduce the risk for heart disease, cancer, stroke, diabetes, high blood pressure,
obesity, and clinical depression (California Walnut Board 2008b).
Walnut imports have been minimal, accounting for less than 1 percent of the to-
tal U.S. supply in 2006/07 (Pollack & Perez 2008). Conversely, walnut exports have
been rising. For most of the 1980s, they comprised about 25 percent of the utilized
crop production. During the last ﬁve marketing years, however, they have accounted
for 45-65 percent of the utilized crop production. The leading export markets are42 Journal of Cooperatives
Canada, Germany, Japan, Korea, and Spain (California Walnut Commission 2008).
During the 2003/04 marketing year, DWG’s exports (excluding Canada) accounted
for27percentofitsnetsales(DiamondFoods2005b).AllthegrowthinCalifornia’s
walnut exports is attributable to shelled walnuts, rather than unshelled walnuts. In
2006, shelled walnuts accounted for 30 percent of California’s walnut exports (Cal-
ifornia Walnut Commission 2008).
Two mandated commodity programs support the industry. The California Wal-
nut Board was established through a federal marketing order in 1948. It is responsi-
ble for maintaining product quality through grades and standards, providing supply
and domestic market information, managing crop production research, and direct-
ing generic domestic market promotion. The California Walnut Commission, estab-
lished by the California legislature, is responsible for export market development.
Bothgroupsarecomprisedofwalnutgrowers,handlers,andapublicmember.Since
DWG’s conversion, the only cooperative remaining in the walnut industry is the
California Walnut Bargaining Association. However, it has maintained a low proﬁle
and possesses only a small membership (California Walnut Bargaining Association
2005).
Description of the Conversion
DWG’s Changing Structure
Michael Mendes was hired by DWG in 1991 and served in various sales and
marketingpositionsbeforebecomingDWG’spresidentandCEO in1998(Diamond
Foods 2005a). Shortly thereafter, the cooperative began making changes that moved
it away from the traditional cooperative structure. One major change occurred in
1998, when the board dropped its policy to retain 3.5 percent of members’ annual
proceeds. Typically, these retained funds were revolved to members after ﬁve years.
At the time, crop retains totaled US$14.6 million, along with US$16.2 million in
working capital retains (repaid within 15 months) and US$7.6 in unallocated earn-
ings for a total member equity of US$38.4 million. DWG replaced member equity
capital by creating a wholly owned subsidiary, Diamond Walnut Capital Trust, that
issued US$15.0 million in cumulative securities at a 7.2 percent cumulative pre-
ferred dividend rate to an institutional investor (Diamond Walnut Growers 1998).
Mandatory redemptions of the cumulative securities and loans were scheduled for
2009, 2010, and 2011 at US$5 million each.
DWG engaged in extensive brand-building efforts. In 2002, DWG introduced its
line of Diamond glazed nut products, such as apple-cinnamon glazed walnuts and
pecan pie glazed pecans. Between 1999–2000 and 2004–2005, DWG’s consumer
retail sales rose from US$95 million to US$186 million (Diamond Foods 2005b).Vol. 23[2009] 43
Table 1. DWG’s Financial Results, 2000–2004 in US$
Fiscal Year Ending July 31 Average




257.4 218.8 279.0 252.1 297.4 260.9
Net proceeds/lb $0.471 $0.618 $0.596 $0.600 $0.605 $0.578
Average independent
price /lb
$0.408 $0.623 $0.569 $0.555 $0.565 $0.544
DWG’s premium /lb $0.063 ($0.005) $0.027 $0.045 $0.040 $0.034
Diamond’s advertising
expenses (’000)
$6,327 $9,720 $9,105 $8,744 $14,673 $9,714
Diamond’s advertising
expenses/lb
$0.025 $0.044 $0.033 $0.035 $0.049 $0.037
Nonpatronage earnings
(’000)
$1,229 $2,491 $2,072 $1,827 $40 ($6,545)
Source: Diamond Foods 2005a; Diamond Walnut Growers 2005b.
In August 2004, DWG launched its Emerald of California snack nut line nation-
ally, with ﬂavors such as glazed chocolate brownie walnuts and mixed nuts (the
latter requiring the purchase of other nut varieties). With this move, DWG became
a competitor in the snack nut industry. As DWG noted in its ﬁlings with the Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the snack nut market has historically had
one leader, Planters, and a fragmented group of regional and national competitors,
such as Fisher Nuts (Diamond Foods 2005a).
DWG’s ﬁnancial performance data during its last ﬁve years are displayed in ta-
ble 1. DWG’s members earned a premium over the independent handlers’ average
price during eight of its last ten years as a cooperative. After DWG began broaden-
ing its product mix in 1999, its annual price premium averaged US$.034/pound. Its
returns to members were lower than the average price paid by independents only
once—a US$.005/pound shortfall in 2001, which followed the highest premium
paid (US$.063/pound) in 2000. These premiums occurred despite DWG’s sizable
advertising expenditures.44 Journal of Cooperatives
The Conversion Process
Diamond Foods was created on 14 February 2005, when it ﬁled for incorpo-
ration in Delaware as a wholly owned subsidiary of DWG. During its 22 March
2005 meeting, DWG’s board unanimously approved the conversion of DWG into
a stockholder-owned corporation by merging with and into Diamond Foods. Two
days later, Diamond Foods ﬁled a preliminary prospectus for an initial public offer-
ing (IPO) of its common stock with the SEC as part of its proposed conversion to
a stockholder-owned corporation. The key aspects of the proposed conversion and
stock offering were:
• A maximum of 8,060,207 shares of Diamond Foods common stock would
be issued to DWG members, allocated in proportion to each member’s pa-
tronage during the two crop years with the highest value for the member out
of the previous six crop years. Up to US$18.6 million (1.3 million shares,
based on the estimated IPO price of US$15 per share) would be paid to DWG
members who elected to receive cash in lieu of stock, for an estimated total
compensation of US$119.7 million. The stock would be freely tradable on
the NASDAQ after a 360-day holding period.
• DWGmemberswouldreceivetheirworkingcapitalretains(US$41.7million)
in cash and Diamond Foods would retain US$17.5 million in unallocated
earnings, less the US$6.5 million loss during 2004–2005.
• Diamond Foods expected to sell 5,333,333 shares of common stock in an
IPO and raise an estimated US$70.9 million in net proceeds. Approximately
US$17.1 million of these funds would be used to pay off a long-term loan.
The balance of the proceeds from the IPO would be used primarily to de-
velop and market value-added products and install new equipment to gain
processing efﬁciencies.
• Three of the 13 members of DWG’s board would be appointed to Diamond
Foods’ nine member board, as companies listed on the NASDAQ are required
to have a majority of outside directors on their boards. The other “inside”
director would be DWG’s president and CEO, Michael Mendes. A Grower
Executive Council would be comprised initially of the ten members of the
DWG board who did not transition to the Diamond Foods board. It would
provide input solely in an advisory capacity regarding walnut grading and
overall grower support and service.Vol. 23[2009] 45
• Independent of their vote whether to keep or sell their Diamond Foods stock,
DWGmemberswouldbeofferedmarketingagreementsfortheirwalnuts(Di-
amond Foods 2005a).
Communications made by DWG to its members regarding the proposed conver-
sion included:
• On 24 March 2005, Chairman Gilbert and CEO Mendes sent a letter noti-
fying members of the proposed conversion. Gilbert and Mendes stated that
the conversion would strengthen Diamond ﬁnancially and convert members’
interests into marketable stock shares.
• During mid-April 2005, DWG held three regional grower meetings.
• DWG’s spring/summer 2005 member magazine, Diamond News, included
a one-third-page article about the proposed conversion (Diamond Walnut
Growers 2005a).
• On 16 June 2005, Chairman Gilbert sent a letter with voting materials, a dis-
closure statement (114 pages, plus ﬁnancial statements), and the Walnut Pur-
chase Agreement.
• On 17 June 2005, the DWG board sent a letter reiterating the importance of
reading the disclosure statement and the need for additional capital resources.
• On 23 June 2005, Chairman Gilbert replied to a letter sent by Concerned
Diamond Walnut Growers on 15 June (described below).
• From 28 to 30 June 2005, DWG held three regional meetings (Diamond
Foods 2005b).
In accordance with DWG’s recently revised bylaws, votes for the conversion
proposal were allocated to members based on their share of total walnut deliveries
during the two preceding crop years. There were 1,735 members entitled to cast a
total of 284,781 votes, with DWG’s board members holding 11 percent of the votes.
On 1 July 2005, over 80 percent of DWG members voted to approve the con-
version at a special meeting. On 20 July 2005, Diamond Foods announced an IPO
of 6 million shares of its common stock at a price of US$17 per share. During the
ﬁrst week of trading, share prices ranged between US$20.50 and US$22.10.46 Journal of Cooperatives
Key Individuals in the Conversion
DWG’s CEO was a key individual in the conversion. Sam Keiper, vice president
forgrowerrelationsandcorporateaffairs,andtheboardchairman,JohnGilbert,had
signiﬁcant interaction with members during the conversion voting process. Addi-
tionally, DWG hired Seth Halio in January 2005 to serve as executive vice president
and chief ﬁnancial ofﬁcer and work closely with the external agents involved in the
preparation of the public stock offering. Halio had previously worked with Steven
Neil, who was appointed to the Diamond Foods board. External agents included a
San Francisco-based legal ﬁrm, Fenwick & West, LLP, and three investment banker
underwriters, with Merrill Lynch as the lead.
Forty DWG members, identifying themselves as Concerned Diamond Walnut
Growers and led by Jay Columbini (brother of a DWG board member), sent a mail-
ing to DWG’s membership on 15 June 2005. Their concerns about the proposed
conversion included:
• Loss of member control. Although DWG members would initially hold at
least 60 percent of Diamond Foods’ stock, they would be a minority on the
new board.
• SigniﬁcantﬁnancialgainsforDWG’smanagementanddirectors.Theywould
receive over US$14 million in stock grants and options.
• An inferior marketing contract. If DWG members signed the marketing con-
tract, they would provide working capital to Diamond Foods without interest,
but the market price that they would be paid would be determined approxi-
mately six months after they delivered their walnuts.
• Shift in focus from grower returns to shareholder returns (Concerned Dia-
mond Walnut Growers 2005).
Conceptual Framework
Propertyrightstheoryprovidestheconceptualframeworkforanalyzingthecon-
version of DWG from a cooperative into a publicly traded stockholder-owned cor-
poration. Three aspects of property rights are particularly relevant when evaluating
cooperative conversions: the horizon problem, the principal-agent problem, and the
free rider problem. Compared to investor-owned ﬁrms (IOFs), cooperatives have
ambiguities in the structure of their property rights that can create these problems,
which, in turn, may cause some cooperatives to transition into other organizational
forms. Porter and Scully (1987) examined the impact of these problems on the ef-
ﬁciency of agricultural cooperatives, while both Cook (1995) and Fulton (1995)Vol. 23[2009] 47
extended the property rights framework to analyze structural changes in coopera-
tives.
InvestorsinIOFsareentitledtodividendsgeneratedbyanasset,andtheresidual
earnings are capitalized into the value of their stock. The horizon problem occurs in
a cooperative because the members are both the users and owners of the ﬁrm’s as-
sets. They have a residual claim to the earnings generated by an asset only as long
as they are patrons of the cooperative, although the asset may have a longer pro-
ductive life. A cooperative’s net earnings are distributed to members in proportion
to their patronage, rather than as a return on their investment. Claims on its assets
cannot be capitalized and transferred by members. Thus, members seek to maxi-
mize their proceeds from the cooperative in the current period rather than invest to
increase their net cash ﬂows in the future. The horizon problem leads to underin-
vestment in assets, particularly intangible assets, such as brand development and
market development (Porter & Scully 1987).
The free rider problem occurs when property rights are not transferable or unas-
signed. Cook (1995) notes that the free rider problem can emerge when new mem-
bers (or even non-members) are entitled to the same patronage and residual rights as
existing members. This effectively reduces the rate of return of existing members’
investment and creates a disincentive for them to invest further. Thus, new members
are able to act opportunistically by under-investing in their cooperative.
Porter and Scully (1987) note that in a cooperative, the decision-control and
risk-bearing functions rest with the members, while decision-management rests
with the management. As principals, the members incur transaction, decision, infor-
mation, and contract monitoring and information costs. This relationship can result
in a principal-agent problem if the agent’s decisions are not easily observable and
the agent has more information. Because producer-members govern most coopera-
tives exclusively, this is more likely to occur when a cooperative goes beyond being
a commodity supplier and engages in marketing value-added products (Hardesty
2005). Without any publicly traded stocks, there is no information available to the
principals (the members) to evaluate the performance of the agent (the manage-
ment). This information asymmetry creates a governance problem. Furthermore,
Fulton and Lang (2006) note that the principals and agents may have divergent
interests. Typically, the membership’s objective is to ensure grower returns, while
the interests of the management could be to pursue their own goals, such as high
compensation levels and perks.48 Journal of Cooperatives
Analysis of the Conversion
The horizon problem, free rider problem, and principal-agent problem are all
applicable to the conversion of DWG. These problems motivated DWG’s members
and/or the management to favor conversion.
The horizon problem was particularly signiﬁcant in inﬂuencing the conversion
of DWG. It was not especially relevant when DWG was a marketer of commod-
ity nuts. However, after DWG experienced large decreases in its domestic sales of
consumer shelled walnuts during the 1980 and early 1990s, it addressed this situa-
tion by providing a full line of culinary nut products to strengthen its competitive
position with retailers (Diamond Foods 2005a). When it entered the higher-margin
snack food market by launching the Emerald brand of glazed nut products and sa-
vory nut mixes, DWG incurred signiﬁcant expenses in advertising and “slotting
fees” to gain distribution. It needed capital for these intangible assets.
However,DWGcitedtwoﬁnancialfactorsleadinguptoitsproposedconversion
that demonstrate the presence of a horizon problem:
• Signiﬁcant member resistance to crop retains caused DWG to seek sources to
ﬁnance its growth.
• “Because the cooperative requires annual distribution of net proceeds of the
business, and there is no ownership interest to reward long-term apprecia-
tion in the value of the enterprise, cooperative members have an incentive to
encourage maximum cash distributions each year and have no incentive to
encourage investment for future growth” (Diamond Foods 2005a, p. 6).
Given the presence of a horizon problem, cooperative members approaching re-
tirement age or planning to change crops would be particularly likely to undervalue
long-term investments. No data were available regarding the age distribution of
DWG’s membership, but SEC ﬁlings indicate that the ages of DWG’s board ranged
from 42 to 78, with an average age of 58. Thus, it would not be inappropriate to
state that the DWG board would have found the conversion to be ﬁnancially attrac-
tive because it enabled them to capitalize the value of DWG’s recent and anticipated
investments in market development. This is consistent with Fulton’s (1995) asser-
tion that a cooperative conversion indicates that members are seeking beneﬁts only
as investors, rather than as users.
The free rider problem is also related to members’ reluctance to invest in their
cooperative. For example, DWG could attract new members if its market devel-
opment efforts were successful in increasing member returns. The new members
would beneﬁt from the investments made in intangible assets by existing members.
DWG did not have a mechanism, such as tiered delivery rights, that would haveVol. 23[2009] 49
required new members to purchase delivery rights to participate in the earnings for
DWG’s higher margin products.
The principal-agent problem relates to DWG’s increasing complexity, particu-
larly with its ﬁnancing and marketing activities. As previously noted, members of
cooperatives do not have the external exchange of information to assess manage-
ment’s performance and proposals. Most members, including some board members,
did not have the expertise to assess the soundness of management’s proposals re-
garding preferred trusts and marketing programs.
It is also likely that most members did not have the expertise to assess the long-
term implications of the proposed conversion of DWG. This manifestation of the
principal-agent problem was compounded by the fact that they had only 100 days to
consider the conversion proposal. Members voted on the conversion without know-
ing how much compensation they would receive for their current ownership in Di-
amond Walnut because of the uncertain value of the common stock they were to
receive. The estimated IPO price of US$15 per share used in the preliminary regis-
tration ﬁlings yielded US$119.5 million in compensation. But the IPO could have
occurred with a share price as low as US$5, in which case members would have
received only US$40.3 million for their ownership interest in Diamond Walnut (Di-
amond Foods 2005a). (Based on the actual IPO price of US$17, the aggregate value
to members for the shares and cash paid in the conversion totaled US$154.3 million,
thus exceeding expectations.)
DWG’s members also needed to determine whether the estimated payment of
US$119 million in stock and cash was a fair offer for losing their rights to price pre-
miums for their future walnut deliveries. That 95 percent of DWG members signed
marketing agreements with Diamond Foods for an average term of ﬁve years (Van
Konynenburg 2008) suggests a principal-agent problem. Members were sent copies
of the marketing agreement along with the SEC ﬁling documents. They had the op-
tion to extend their existing DWG marketing agreement by three, ﬁve, or ten years,
and were required to deliver their entire crop to Diamond Foods for the duration
of the contract. No set price was offered. Instead, the agreement speciﬁed, “Each
March (following the harvest), Diamond Foods will determine a purchase price
based on market conditions, quality, variety and other relevant factors” (Diamond
Foods 2005a, pp. 36–37). The agreement’s four-payment schedule, the last one oc-
curring 15 months after delivery, was very similar to DWG’s historical payment
structure.
Memberswhosignedthemarketingagreementplacedthemselvesintoamonop-
sonistic situation. The contract offered no price protection or guarantee to pay mar-
ket prices. Instead, the monopsonistic relationship made the contracting growers
vulnerable to price manipulation. When attending a grower meeting organized by
University of California Cooperative Extension farm advisors in May 2005, some50 Journal of Cooperatives
growers made comments that indicated that they did not understand that the mar-
keting agreement was a separate decision from their conversion vote and/or that
they would no longer be receiving the ﬁrm’s net proceeds. The conversion caused
Diamond Foods’ mission to shift from “delivering annual net proceeds to members
to maximizing long-term shareholder value” (Diamond Foods 2005a, p. 18). While
DWG members who became shareholders of Diamond Foods could beneﬁt from
dividends and stock appreciation, they could also be adversely impacted as suppli-
ers by Diamond Foods’ strategy to maximize shareholder value by improving gross
and operating margins.
Conclusions
Four years have passed since DWG’s conversion. Diamond Foods has consis-
tently paid a quarterly dividend, which started at US$0.03/share and has since risen
to US$0.045/share. Its share price has ﬂuctuated considerably, but has trended up-
ward in 2008 and traded between US$24 and US$30 during the past quarter. How-
ever, some DWG members who signed marketing agreements are dissatisﬁed with
the outcome. In September 2007, 42 former members organized to consider ﬁling
a lawsuit based on a belief that they were underpaid by at least 13 percent for their
2005 and 2006 walnut crops (Van Konynenburg 2008).
DWG’s conversion appears to have been beneﬁcial for members who were ap-
proaching retirement age. It enabled them to capitalize their investment in building
DWG’s branded program and line of value-added culinary and snack nut products.
However, DWG’s horizon problem, as well its free rider problem, could both have
been addressed by issuing or selling tiered delivery rights to members while main-
taining the cooperative structure. For example, members with the highest value de-
livery rights would be entitled to earnings from the “snack nut” pool, while mem-
bers holding the second highest value delivery rights would be entitled to earnings
from the value-added “culinary nut” pool. New members would have to purchase
delivery rights to participate in the earnings from these pools. When members re-
tired or changed crops, their delivery rights would be sold to other members, with
thepricereﬂectingthepool’spastandprojectedperformance.Deliveryrightswould
protect the investments that members made in advertising and other market devel-
opment efforts.
The principal-agent problem is less easily addressed. Assessing marketing strat-
egy and complex ﬁnancing proposals requires specialized expertise that most wal-
nut growers are not likely to have. DWG’s principal-agent problem did not surface
overnight, but rather evolved over many years as members became less involved in
the governance of their cooperative and had minimal interaction with their board
members, particularly when the cooperative undertook more complex strategic is-Vol. 23[2009] 51
sues. It may be necessary for boards of cooperatives engaged in marketing value-
added products and other complex business strategies to hire technical advisors to
assess such arrangements from the members’ perspective and share their opinions
with members. The ﬁnancial audit ﬁrms hired by cooperative boards do not serve
in such a proactive capacity. Some cooperatives’ boards have one, even two out-
side directors. They need to have a stronger commitment to membership than to
management in order to maintain a healthy tension between principals and agents.
As strategic issues faced by cooperatives have become more complex, new
mechanisms need to be developed to resolve the imperfect property rights inherent
in the cooperative structure. Strong member participation and leadership, as well as
close working relationships with university academics knowledgeable about coop-
eratives, marketing, and ﬁnance, would be beneﬁcial to fostering such innovations.
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